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Abstract Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to
settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference
about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon
their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would,
for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict.
Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when
would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a
compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion,
and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a
substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation
within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how
arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way.
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When cooperating with others we need to compromise now and then.1 If we want to
arrive at a shared decision but cannot convince our peers to go all the way along
with us, we need to settle for less than we really prefer: a compromise. A
compromise, as we shall elaborate the concept in this paper, is a special kind of
agreement based on mutual concessions or sacrifices. Such a compromise will have
to result from discussing one or more proposals and their pros and cons. The
interpersonal exchange of reasons, or ‘‘reasoning’’ as we shall simply label it in this
paper, always plays a vital role in such a dialogue, and since the initial situation of
the dialogue is one of disagreement or conflict one may expect this reasoning to be
aimed at overcoming the doubts of one’s interlocutor, i.e. to have an argumentative
function.2
For instance, suppose that Bob and Wilma (who live in the Netherlands) are
making plans for their vacation. When deciding on their destination, are they going
to opt for Bob’s proposal to camp on a Dutch island nearby or for Wilma’s proposal
to stay at a hotel far away at the Algarve? Bob might offer to drop his demand for a
vacation on a Dutch island in return for Wilma’s sacrifice of her demand for a hotel.
In this way, Bob may have created a convincing reason for Wilma, but also for
himself, to settle at camping at the Algarve. After all, they might both prefer
camping at the Algarve to not having a shared holiday, and the proposed
compromise might be seen as striking a fair balance between their diverging wishes
as well as being the result of a fair procedure. In such a negotiation dialogue, there is
interplay of argumentation and negotiation and elsewhere, we examine this
interplay in some detail (van Laar and Krabbe 2016b, Section 4; 2017a). Bob and
Wilma differ in their preferences but these differences, by themselves, do not
necessarily give rise to any difference of opinion. Yet, in their negotiation process,
use is made of argumentation.
Compromises are fashioned also in situations in which the parties do not merely
conflict as to their private or partisan interests and preferences, but where they also
differ in their opinions regarding the course of action or policy that ought to be
adopted. Wilma may not only privately prefer a hotel at the Algarve but also be of
the opinion that a hotel at the Algarve would provide for the best possible vacation
for both, whereas Bob disagrees and contends that, actually, camping on a Dutch
island outcompetes the alternative. In such a situation, there is not only a difference
of interest but also a difference of opinion. Typical examples of such hybrid
differences can be found among politicians who advance idealistic points of view to
defend their preferred choice of policy.
Compromises may even be the intended outcome if the participants do not have
conflicting private or partisan interests, but only a difference of opinion. Take, for
instance, two parents disagreeing on what would be the best way to raise their
1 An earlier version of this paper has appeared as Sections 1, 2, and 3 of van Laar and Krabbe (2016b).
2 In our survey of the functions of reasoning (Krabbe and van Laar 2007, pp. 28–31), we proposed to use
the term ‘‘argumentative function [of reasoning]’’ in the sense of being ‘‘used in some kind of conflict in
order to overcome doubt of an interlocutor’’ (p. 31).
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children: Should John go to a Christian private school or to a secular public one?
Should Mary be allowed to go to this friend’s party? In each case neither parent may
be able to convince the other; even so they could solve the problem by a
compromise that is not motivated by any other concerns than the child’s well-being
and a prompt decision. Thus, discussants who are unable to convince their
interlocutors of the objective worth of action proposals are sometimes willing to
search instead for a compromise that each may conceive as only a second choice,
but fair and preferable to a lasting conflict.
In this paper, we are particularly interested in dialogues about an action proposal
in which the participants shift from a persuasion dialogue about the proposal’s
merits, towards a negotiation dialogue in which they aim at splitting their difference
of opinion in a reasonable way. Though some work has been done within
argumentation studies on the norms for shifting from persuasion dialogue to
negotiation dialogue (Walton and Krabbe 1995; Wells and Reed 2003), a dialectical
account in terms of how to justify such a shift to a skeptical interlocutor requires
more detail. The emphasis in our account is on the feasibility of making such shifts
in a dialectically reasonable manner but in this connection we think we should also
take into account that there are pathological shifts and to that end discuss the
Fallacy of Bargaining (cf. Walton and Krabbe 1995, p. 104).
We further want to contribute to the theory of argumentation by investigating the
difference between resolving and settling a difference of opinion. In our view, a
study of the connections between argumentation and negotiation requires an account
of the concept of a compromise that is explicit about how it relates to the resolution
of differences of opinion. Though within dialectical argumentation theory some
steps have been taken in this direction (Walton 1998, Chapter 4; van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 2004, pp. 57–58), again, a sufficiently detailed account is not yet to be
found. Dialogue participants may possibly be less clear-headed about the distinction
than their dialogue requires, and thus, again, we take into account that there are
pathological cases, this time under the heading of the Fallacy of Middle Ground.
The two sections that follow deal with two questions. (1) What reasons might
warrant a shift from a persuasion dialogue to a negotiation dialogue; and under what
conditions would such a shift from persuasion dialogue to negotiation dialogue be a
licit shift, rather than a fallacious one? (2) What is the nature of a compromise, in
contradistinction to a resolution? In follow-up studies, we examine the role of
arguments within the context of negotiation and compromise formation (van Laar
and Krabbe 2016b, Section 4; 2017a), as well as the criticism and defense of
compromises vis-a`-vis supporters and others who have not been actively partici-
pating in the construction of the compromise solution (van Laar and Krabbe 2017b).
2 Reasons to Shift from Persuasion Dialogue to Negotiation Dialogue
A natural setting for initiating a negotiation dialogue, though certainly not the only
one, is the situation that occurs within a persuasion dialogue when both parties have
attempted but failed to convince the other of the acceptability of one’s own favorite
policy option. When developing our views on the shift to negotiation, we start from
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the theory of dialogue types, as developed by Walton and Krabbe (1995). A
persuasion dialogue, then, is the kind of dialogue that starts from a difference of
opinion and in which the participants try to convince one another of their standpoint
by appealing to reasons that the other side is willing to concede, doing so in a
cooperative endeavor to resolve their difference of opinion on the merits of both
sides (Walton and Krabbe 1995, Section 3.1; Walton 1998, Chapter 2; van Eemeren
and Grootendorst 2004, Chapter 6). The failure to find a resolution may prompt the
parties to shift to a negotiation dialogue, which is a dialogue that starts from a
difference of interests or from a difference of opinion (see Introduction) and in
which the participants aim at getting as much as possible what they want, doing so
in a cooperative attempt to strike a deal (Walton and Krabbe 1995, Section 3.1;
Walton 1998, Chapter 4). What would be good reasons to make this shift from
persuasion dialogue to negotiation dialogue, and under what conditions would such
a shift be a licit shift, rather than a fallacious one?3 Before we come to these
questions we will elaborate on persuasion dialogues starting from a mixed
difference of opinion (i.e. a difference of opinion in which both parties have
expressed a standpoint) about policies or action proposals. For these are the kind of
persuasion dialogues that naturally could shift to a negotiation dialogue.
2.1 Resolving Mixed Differences of Opinion About Action Proposals
Let us assume that party A and party B have advanced opposing positions regarding
the policy they should adopt in order to respond to a social problem or contingency:
party A contends that the best response would be to adopt policy Alpha, whereas
party B favors policy Beta but adoption of policy Alpha would be incompatible with
adoption of policy Beta. Let the thesis defended by party A be that they should
adopt policy Alpha and consequently not policy Beta (proposition a). Let the thesis
defended by B be the contrary (but not necessarily contradictory) proposition to the
effect that they should adopt policy Beta and consequently not Alpha (proposition
b).
Let us illustrate the situation by means of an example. In 2012, two Dutch
political parties, the Labor Party (PvdA) and the Liberal Party (VVD) agreed to
form a coalition government. Part of their agreement dealt with renewable energy.
As a starting point, the Labor Party (party A) proposed that the level of renewable
energy be increased to 18% in 2020 (policy Alpha), whereas the Liberal Party (party
B) favored a policy of increasing the level of renewable energy to just 14% in 2020
(policy Beta) (Visser 2012).
Now let us further assume that party A and party B engage in a persuasion
dialogue in which both parties seriously try to convince the other of the superiority
of one’s own preferred policy and thus to resolve their difference of opinion. How
must we apply the notion of a resolution of a difference of opinion in the present
3 When two parties choose to engage in a dialogue of a specific type, they commit themselves to
contribute to the realization of the main goal of that type of dialogue type. We assume that such a choice
brings particular dialogical obligations. Thus, a shift to a different dialogue type can be the subject of
normative evaluation.
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case of a mixed difference of opinion, and what kind of outcomes plausibly give rise
to a shift to negotiation dialogue?
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst defined the notion of ‘‘resolution’’ for non-mixed
differences of opinion, where a protagonist defends one standpoint and an
antagonist takes a position of critical doubt yet without adopting an opposed
standpoint of her own. In such a situation, the difference of opinion is said to have
been resolved either ‘‘when the arguments advanced [by the protagonist] lead the
antagonist to accept the standpoint defended, or when the protagonist retracts his
standpoint as a consequence of the critical reactions of the antagonist’’ (van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 133). But here we are dealing with a mixed
difference of opinion in which each of the two parties takes the role of protagonist
regarding its own standpoint (party A defending standpoint a, party B defending b)
and the role of antagonist regarding the other party’s standpoint. Therefore there are
two non-mixed differences involved and we need to check what outcomes of the
persuasion dialogue are now possible and which of them we would want to call
resolutions, either fully or partially, of the mixed difference of opinion composed of
these two non-mixed differences. In particular, we are interested in those outcomes
that would naturally lead to a shift to negotiation.
At the end of a persuasion dialogue between parties A and B, each party may
either maintain its standpoint or retract it, also each party may either maintain its
critical stance towards the standpoint of the other or retract its critical stance, i.e.
concede the standpoint of the other. But since the propositions a and b are (we
presume: manifestly) incompatible, we may exclude that a party maintains its own
standpoint and concedes the contrary standpoint of the other. Therefore, for each
party there are only three instead of four possibilities:
(1) a party (say party A) maintains its standpoint (maintains a) and maintains
its critical stance towards the contrary standpoint of the other (criticizes b);
(2) party A retracts its own standpoint (retracts a) as well as its critical stance
towards party B’s standpoint, thereby conceding the latter (concedes b);
(3) party A retracts its own standpoint (retracts a) yet sees no reason to retract
its critical stance towards party B’s standpoint (criticizes b).
Similarly, there are three possibilities for party B, which yields nine possible
outcomes. Of these nine possible outcomes, three may count as ‘‘full resolutions’’.
Full resolution:
(Outcome (i):) If party A acts according to (1) and party B according to (2), the
mixed difference of opinion will have been fully resolved in favor of party A.
(Outcome (ii):) If party A acts in according to (2) and party B according to (1),
the mixed difference of opinion will have been fully resolved in favor of party B.
(Outcome (iii):) If both parties act according to (3), the mixed difference of
opinion will have been fully resolved, partly in favor of party A and partly in
favor of party B.
Outcome (iii) differs from the other two in that, even though the differences of
opinion are resolved, there is now no action proposal left to be adopted. This
situation would, so we think, give naturally rise to a deliberation dialogue, which
Splitting a Difference of Opinion: The Shift to Negotiation
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starting from an open problem of a practical nature (and, differently than a
persuasion dialogue, not from some kind of conflict), allows the participants to
explore new policy options (Walton and Krabbe 1995, pp. 73–74).
A persuasion dialogue arising from a mixed difference of opinion, which is
composed of several non-mixed differences of opinion, results in, what we call, a
‘‘partial resolution’’ if some of its non-mixed differences of opinion are resolved but
others not. For instance, (outcome (iv):) party A acts according to (1) and B
according to (3), for though the difference of opinion about b gets resolved in favor
of party A, the difference about a remains unresolved. Another case of partial
resolution is where (outcome (v):) party B acts according to (1) and party A acts
according to (3).
We shall say that a non-mixed difference of opinion about standpoint s is
‘‘weakly resolved’’ if at the end of the persuasion dialogue the proponent retracts s
whereas the opponent concedes it. In three possible outcomes of the persuasion
dialogue between party A and party B, at least one of the component non-mixed
differences of opinion is only weakly resolved: (outcome (vi):) If A and B both act
according to (2), so that both differences of opinion are weakly resolved; (outcome
(vii):) A acts according to (2) and B according to (3), so that issue a gets resolved in
favor of party B but issue b gets resolved only in a weak sense; (outcome (viii):) A
acts according to (3) and B according to (2), so that issue b gets resolved in favor of
A but issue a gets resolved only in a weak sense.4
The outcome that most naturally gives rise to a shift towards negotiation (though
a shift to deliberation is never excluded) is where (Outcome (ix):) party A and party
B both act according to (1), so that they each maintain their own standpoint and
their critical stance towards the standpoint of the other and no progress is made
towards resolution, except for possibly gaining a better understanding of the issue.
When it has become obvious that a persuasion dialogue only leads to a stalemate, it
is less opportune to start another persuasion dialogue and perhaps time to look for
other ways to make progress. Here the negotiation dialogue is an obvious candidate.
So, when the discussion is deadlocked on whether to increase the level of renewable
energy to 14% or to 18%, the parties may try to negotiate a middle ground position,
such as by splitting the difference at 16%. The outcomes (iv)–(viii) would, we think,
like Outcome (iii) give most naturally rise to a deliberation dialogue,. The reason is
that with these outcomes, either none of the parties maintains any standpoint
(outcomes (iii), (vi), (vii), and (viii)) or one of them does not maintain one
(outcomes (iv) and (v)), so that a proper starting point for negotiation is lacking.
Rather one or both participants may be motivated to search for what it might regard
4 A weak resolution occurs when the proponent is convinced by the opponent’s criticism and the
opponent by the proponent’s arguments. It is close to swapping positions. Yet it differs in two respects:
retracting one’s standpoint is short of taking a critical stance toward one’s former standpoint and
conceding the standpoint of the other is short of asserting it and making it one’s own standpoint. When a
weakly resolved dispute would swing to a full swapping of positions, the parties may naturally re-open a
persuasion dialogue in which they each defend their newly acquired standpoint against their newly
acquired critic. Thus, in some spectacular cases the outcome (see Outcome vi in Table 1) may prompt a
mixed persuasion dialogue, based on a two-fold swapping of the roles of proponent and opponent,
whereas other outcomes (see Outcome vii in Table 1) and (Outcome viii) may prompt a non-mixed
persuasion dialogue, based on a single swapping.
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as a proper response to the policy issue at hand. A deliberation dialogue is befitting
such a setting.5 We summarize the nine outcomes in Table 1.
2.2 Reasons for a Shift to Negotiation
We suppose now that, at a certain point in their persuasion dialogue, the parties, A
and B, have made serious attempts to convince the other but that no full resolution
has been realized. Further, we suppose that party A does not expect that this
persuasion dialogue will ever result in a full resolution nor that a different
persuasion dialogue about a somewhat different policy proposal, for instance one
generated in a deliberation dialogue, will succeed in that sense. Next, we suppose
that at this point party A proposes to abandon the persuasion dialogue and to turn to
a negotiation dialogue aimed at reaching some compromise. Party A may table such
a proposal explicitly but can also do so more implicitly; for example, it may just
launch the negotiation dialogue by making a quid pro quo move: ‘‘If you would
mitigate your demands regarding policy Alpha (for example by accepting a level of
renewable energy of 16% in 2020, rather than only 14%), we would be willing to
mitigate our demand for rejecting policy Beta (for example by accepting a level of
16% in 2020 rather than the full 18%)’’. In order to examine the dialogical
possibilities in more detail, however, we finally suppose that party A before making
a first offer, tables an explicit proposal to pursue their conversation in another way:
‘‘We propose that we abandon our persuasion dialogue on this issue and initiate a
negotiation dialogue in order to find out whether we can agree on some
compromise’’. In Sect. 3, we shall examine in more detail the nature of a
compromise (the kind of outcome party A allegedly has in mind when trying to shift
to negotiation dialogue) and how that kind of outcome compares to the resolution of
Table 1 The possible outcomes of a persuasion dialogue arising from a mixed difference of opinion
(party A’s standpoint being a and party B’s standpoint being b)
Outcome Party A’s final stance Party B’s final stance Type of outcome
i (1) Maintaining a; criticizing b (2) Retracting b; conceding a Full resolution
ii (2) Retracting a; conceding b (1) Maintaining b; criticizing a Full resolution
iii (3) Retracting a; criticizing b (3) Retracting b; criticizing a Full resolution
iv (1) Maintaining a; criticizing b (3) Retracting b; criticizing a Partial resolution
v (3) Retracting a; criticizing b (1) Maintaining b; criticizing a Partial resolution
vi (2) Retracting a; conceding b (2) Retracting b; conceding a Weak resolution
vii (2) Retracting a; conceding b (3) Retracting b; criticizing a Partial and weak
resolution
viii (3) Retracting a; criticizing b (2) Retracting b; conceding a Partial and weak
resolution
ix (1) Maintaining a; criticizing b (1) Maintaining b; criticizing a No resolution at all
5 If, then, the deliberation dialogue generates a policy Gamma, disagreement may in turn arise over the
desirability of that new policy proposal, and the parties can try to resolve the issue within a new
persuasion dialogue, about the acceptability of a new standpoint (proposition c).
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a difference of opinion aimed for in persuasion dialogue. For now it suffices to start
from the assumption that by proposing to shift to a negotiation dialogue, party A
proposes to work together on developing an agreement based on mutual sacrifices.6
In such a situation, what might be the reasons for party A to propose the shift, and
how may party A convince party B to accept such a proposal? After all, party A
cannot take it for granted that party B considers some sort of agreement about the
policy issue as intrinsically better than a lasting disagreement about it. We examine
this issue in a dialectical vein by listing a number of answers party A may advance
in response to the challenge that we imagine party B advances in response to the
proposal: ‘‘Why shift thus?’’ and by pointing out some further considerations with
which the parties can test the adequacy of the reasons offered by Party A for shifting
thus.
The principal reason for shifting away from persuasion dialogue, as well as from
further deliberation about alternative policy options and persuasion dialogues about
these options, is the expectation that the persuasion dialogue’s common goal of
resolving differences of opinion is not realizable for the issue under discussion and
that consensus is therefore out of reach. Possibly, in party A’s estimation, all
available options and considerations have been advanced, without there being any
prospects for gaining further insights about the position of the other or about the
issue at hand, let alone for resolving the present difference of opinion. Apparently,
party B finds no reason to budge, and neither does party A. ‘‘A full resolution is
beyond reach and dragging out the persuasion dialogue would not serve any
purpose’’, so party A may claim in order to justify to party B its proposal to abandon
the current persuasion dialogue.
But why turn to negotiation, rather than to another type of dialogue, such as an
eristic one, or to a non-discursive device for ending the dispute, such as having a
vote on the matter, or throwing the dice? The possible answers we here attribute to
party A and the responses we attribute to party B are inspired by a discussion
between Simon Ca˘bulea May (2005) and Daniel Weinstock (2013).7 In his paper,
May defends that political compromises can, depending on the situation, be justified
by means of, what he labels, pragmatic reasons. One has a pragmatic reason to
compromise if the existence of disagreement makes it unlikely that one’s political or
moral aims can be realized whereas it is likely that a compromise would enable one
to realize one’s aims at least to a certain extent (May 2005, p. 320). May conjectures
that ‘‘moral compromise in political life is only ever warranted for pragmatic
reasons’’ (May 2005, p. 317). Weinstock, however, contends that there are also
principled, moral reasons for compromise, namely, reasons appealing to the
existence of dissenting peers that do not boil down to pragmatic reasons (Weinstock
6 Political negotiation processes can be conceived as involving a shift from persuasion dialogue to a
negotiation dialogue in so-far as the parties concerned acknowledge that their earlier attempts to persuade
one another have failed. For example, it is because no consensus had been realized about how to balance
diverse policy preferences concerning the limits to be set on the rise of temperature, with compensations
for poor countries and with transparency measures, that the United Nations called for the negotiations that
resulted in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in 2015.
7 The discussion between May and Weinstock concerns the related, but somewhat different issue,
whether there are principled reasons for accepting a particular compromise.
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2013, p. 538). What May labels ‘‘pragmatic reasons’’, Weinstock generally calls
‘‘strategic arguments’’. But Weinstock seems to assemble some of the reasons that
May would include as ‘‘pragmatic reasons’’ in a class of ‘‘arguments from
principled consequentialism’’ and thereby to assign them a special moral status
(Weinstock 2013, p. 553). In order to justify its proposal to shift to a negotiation
dialogue, our party A draws upon the justificatory resources provided by Weinstock.
Party B engages critically with these justifications, making use of the more skeptical
considerations about principled compromise advanced by May.
Party A then finds five reasons for compromising: a strategic (pragmatic) reason
and four more principled reasons.8 We list them below, labeling them in line with
Weinstock’s nomenclature. We also provide a sketch of a number of plausible
dialectical exchanges, thereby elaborating on the idea of having available good,
convincing reasons to shift from persuasion to negotiation dialogue.
(1) The strategic argument
Party A may justify its proposal to party B, saying: ‘‘By arguing you achieve
nothing. By negotiation you achieve at least something’’. Party A explains to party
B that a mutually agreed upon compromise will admittedly not provide either of
them with its favorite policy but with a policy that, though second-best, will—given
the personal or partisan interests of both parties—yet be preferable to a lasting
disagreement (see May 2005, p. 319; Weinstock 2013, p. 541). The positive
consequences appealed to can be quite diverse, and include a commonly accepted
policy, the termination of a disruptive dispute, or simply profiting from the yields of
cooperation. Typically, time pressures the interlocutors to opt for negotiation (and to
abandon persuasion dialogue) when the parties need to coordinate swiftly to avoid
harm or to take advantage of an opportunity. Thus, or so party A may claim, it’s
prudent to shift to negotiation. (And if desired, they can return to the initial
persuasion dialogue at a later, calmer moment, more suitable for reflection.)
This line of reasoning could convince party B. But then, party B may express its
qualms about it. Party B may assess the situation differently, and if this party is
unable to compromise or does not assume that a compromise is going to result, or at
least not an outcome that is preferable to the situation that will result when no deal is
made, it can be expected to reject the proposal. A special version of this objection
that B may advance is that an agreed upon compromise will require the violation of
a principle that B regards as non-negotiable. Margalit, for instance, although
pleading for a spirit of compromise in international affairs, and even defending
some unjust compromises for the sake of peace, stops short of the moral acceptance
of compromises that include ‘‘an agreement to establish or maintain an inhuman
regime, a regime of cruelty and humiliation’’ (Margalit 2010, p. 2). Note that the
appeal to non-negotiable principles can also serve as a response to any of A’s other
reasons, discussed below.
8 The last three of these five kinds of reasons are also available beyond a setting where a persuasion has
failed or is doomed to fail. We thank an anonymous referee for this observation.
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(2) The argument from principled consequentialism
Party A may justify its proposal, saying: ‘‘It would just be wrong to neglect the
possibility of realizing at least part of your aims’’. Weinstock argues that a cost–
benefit analysis can also be considered to provide a principled reason in support of
compromise. He stresses the principled motivation for developing a compromise if
the latter is considered to advance one’s moral aims (Weinstock 2013,
pp. 552–554). After all, the outcome may promote cherished values or purposes
of the parties, such as the value party A attaches to the implementation of green
policies and party B’s purpose of keeping public expenditure low. Thus, party A
may answer party B’s challenge by pointing out that a motivation for entering a
negotiation dialogue is provided by the moral ideas and political ideals that party B
itself embraces.
Again, party B may agree, but it may also assess the situation differently and
object that the profits from entering the negotiation dialogue, even if some of these
are moral profits, will not weigh up against the kind of concessions it will be
required to make.
(3) The epistemic argument
Party A may justify its proposal, saying: ‘‘Neither of us can be sure of having a
complete view of all aspects of the situation and a deal might do justice do a wider
array of considerations’’. Party A thus advances an epistemic reason for exploring
the possibility of a compromise—without withdrawing its firm commitment to
policy Alpha as its first preference. This reason could justify a negotiation dialogue
even if one of the contesting parties is in a position to foist its favorite policy option
upon the other side. For each of the parties may come to acknowledge that because
of the complexity of the issue at hand, the policy it favors will, as a matter of fact,
run a risk of not taking adequately into account all relevant considerations. By
compromising, one could do justice to one’s own epistemic fallibility (see the
critical discussion of this consideration by May 2005, pp. 338–340), especially if
one strives for a compromise that integrates various aspects of the parties’ favored
policies (rather than replacing the initial proposals by a quite different third policy)
so that a broader range of considerations will get incorporated in the outcome. If
during the negotiation dialogue one keeps an eye on avoiding the inclusion of those
aspects of these policies that are flawed or mistaken, the result will plausibly be less
prone to error and one-sidedness (see Weinstock 2013, pp. 545–548).
Party B could acknowledge that an outcome is more firmly justified if it
integrates components of the proposals of both parties. Instead, however, party B
may advance the following objection to party A’s proposal: If you would be
interested in an outcome that is based on a broader range of considerations, it would
be more sensible to initiate a deliberation dialogue, in which we both explore
possible improvements, instead of a negotiation dialogue. After all, the outcome of
negotiation may turn out to be more one-sided than desirable, for example by no
longer duly promoting the interests of some of the stakeholders.
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(4) The democratic argument
Party A may also justify its proposal, saying: ‘‘Making a deal with contributions
from both sides is more democratic than a one-sided solution’’. A party may opt for
a negotiation dialogue for the reason that a compromise would reflect at least some
of the opinions or interests of both interlocutors. Thereby, a compromise outcome
can be seen as having a democratic merit. Party A, then, can try to convince party B
to accept the proposal to shift to a negotiation dialogue by an appeal to party B’s
democratic concern for letting not just its own views but also at least some of party
A’s views be reflected in the outcome of their discussion. Party A may add that the
outcome of a persuasion dialogue may be skewed towards those who are well-
equipped with persuasive skills and that there is reason to correct for such a
procedural bias by making a concession to parties that are unable to get things their
way by means of a persuasion dialogue (see Weinstock on compensating for biases
in democratic procedures, 2013, pp. 548–551).
Party B may share this democratic concern. It may, however, instead reject the
idea that democracy ought to produce middle-of-the-road policies that contain
something for each and all. Also, party B could table a counterproposal for the
improvement of the current procedures for persuasion dialogues. If party A has any
specific reasons to think that the rules of the persuasion dialogue unduly favor one
side or the other, this information can be used to improve the procedure along the
way (see Weinstock’s version of this reply, which pertains to democratic decision
making procedures, 2013, pp. 549–550). An attempt to improve the setting for
persuasion dialogue, so party B advances, is more fruitful than a shift to negotiation
dialogue: Concessions made within negotiation dialogue are likely to be ad hoc and
not systemically directed at neutralizing the bias at hand and they need not result in
an improved outcome.
(5) The community-based argument
Finally, party A may justify its proposal, saying: ‘‘To compromise would help to
build a community’’. In this way, party A tries and persuades party B to shift to a
negotiation dialogue by pointing out that a compromise fosters a relationship among
them that is based on mutual concern rather than on a winner-takes-all mentality. It
would be mutually generous if they would aspire at a compromise that includes
preferences from both sides (see Weinstock 2013, pp. 551–552).
Party B may be susceptible to this appeal to its appreciation of this kind of
community, even if this means conceding something to party A. Of course, it may
also be the case that party B doesn’t mind a winner-takes-all mentality and makes it
clear that it prefers a political culture where the winner gets a real chance of
implementing its favored policy to a political culture of moderation in which
controversy is avoided.
These five arguments show that party A has various options for motivating a shift
to negotiation dialogue, so that this party has quite some means for trying to win
over party B to accept its proposal if the latter party would be hesitant to make the
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shift. Of course, party B may not be persuaded by party A’s reasoning – in which
case their dialogue will probably take a different direction.
Walton and Krabbe (1995) have dealt with the procedural requirements for
making licit dialogical shifts, rather than fallacious ones. About the shift from
persuasion dialogue to negotiation dialogue they write:
Sometimes it may be better to close off the persuasion dialogue and try to
settle the matter by negotiation or some other means. The problem is that often
the persuasion dialogue isn’t closed off properly at all and the shift occurs
without both participants being aware of it and agreeing to go along with it.
(Walton and Krabbe 1995, p. 110)
When one party initiates such an illicit shift from a persuasion dialogue to a
negotiation dialogue it is said to commit the Fallacy of Bargaining (substituting
offers for arguments, p. 104), and the receiving side is hindered in its attempt to
realize the goal of the type of dialogue in which it was supposed to be engaged, i.e.
the goal of resolving a difference of opinion within the setting of a persuasion
dialogue.
However, we can assume that when party A makes an explicit proposal to party B
to abandon their persuasion dialogue on a policy issue and to shift towards a
negotiation dialogue about that issue, this party tries to close off the persuasion
dialogue in a proper manner. What is more, party A prepares for the start of a
negotiation dialogue in a way that is fully transparent to its interlocutor. If party B
then, implicitly or explicitly, agrees to shift, possibly after having been offered good
reasons for shifting thus, the fallacy of bargaining will not have been committed
even though the parties now become engaged in quite a different conversational
setting. In our view, the fallacy of bargaining is also avoided by party A if this party
tries to shift from persuasion to negotiation in less wordy and explicit ways, for
example by simply making party B an offer, if only the underlying message and its
implications are within the context of utterance sufficiently clear to party B, so that
party B gets the opportunity to refuse to go along with the implicit proposal to shift
to negotiation.
2.3 Worries About Turning to Negotiation
Granted that there are these ways to justify a transition from persuasion to
negotiation dialogue, one may still have a lingering worry about whether shifts from
persuasion dialogue to negotiation dialogue can ever be legitimate in ‘‘contexts
where epistemic considerations are relevant’’, as David Godden has put it (Godden
2016, p. 3). In Godden’s view, ‘‘what is at issue in epistemic contexts are the
rational merits of competing claims and these are not the sorts of things that can be
gained through bargaining or traded away’’ (p. 4). He illustrates his view by the case
of a divorcing couple fighting over the custody of their children, where each claims
the other to be an unfit parent. If a mediator succeeds in negotiating a shared custody
‘‘such a settlement ought to be manifestly unacceptable to any rational, third-party
judge’’ (Godden 2016, p. 5), because such an outcome should be acceptable only if
both parents are acknowledged as fit parents. Consequently, the parents can only
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rationally agree to any such compromise if they first resolve the fitness issue and
agree that both of them are as a matter of fact fit parents. The fitness issue, however,
can presumably not be settled by negotiation.
Our account of splitting differences of opinion deals only with situations in which
the participants have to make a practical decision, and we agree with Godden that
our account cannot, without further ado, be applied to settings that lack a practical
aspect.9 Practical issues, however, may depend on subordinate issues of a factual or
theoretical nature, such that the participants would have resolved their practical
issue as soon as they were to resolve these ‘‘epistemic’’ issues.10 Also for such
cases, we contend that the parties may turn to compromise, in at least some settings
(our response to Godden can be found in van Laar and Krabbe 2016c).
Take for instance a policy debate on whether to adopt a particular set of measures
in order to keep the average temperature from rising more than two degrees on the
scale of Celsius. Suppose that the parties embrace the same climate goals and that
they all prefer economic over spendthrift policies. Suppose further that one party
believes that these measures are required and sufficient to bring about the intended
effect whereas the other party expects that these measures would not suffice and that
costly additional measures are needed. Then only a factual or theoretical issue
underlies the policy dispute. Nevertheless, we take it for granted that in such a
situation, the parties may have legitimate reasons to split their difference of opinion,
and to inquire into the possibility of modifying the set of measures, possibly by
adding some of the proposed additional costly measures but not all of them. For by
doing so, each party attempts to realize most, yet not all, of what it considers an
appropriate balance between effectiveness and efficiency. That a disputed propo-
sition is factual or theoretical does not and should not keep parties from adopting a
compromise. Godden may object that ‘‘any rational, third-party judge’’ would reject
the outcome, for example because it has not been established that the agreed
measures suffice to save our world from climatological disaster, or because it has
not been excluded that they would lead to an economic disaster. If both disputants
acknowledge this judge as completely rational and neutral, we agree that they have
reason to go along with this judge’s judgments. However, for most controversies, no
such judges are available or disputants disagree over who could act as a rational and
neutral judge. When the participants are left to their own devices but unable to
convince one another on substantial grounds, they would, we think, be better off if
they shifted to negotiation: Negotiation may help them to arrive at a policy that,
from the viewpoint of each of the competing parties, is at least to be preferred to not
adopting any common policy at all and that, moreover, is optimal in the sense of not
admitting an improvement that would be acceptable to all competing parties.
In addition to the case of the divorcing couple, Godden advances plea bargaining
as a context where dialogue shifts from persuasion to negotiation confront ‘‘a moral
9 Note, however, that even a scientific discussion may have a practical aspect, which could make it
opportune to compromise. When co-authoring a handbook chapter, or a scientific dictionary, or a research
proposal, collaborating authors that disagree on how to characterize some theory or define a term may
each be willing to make a concession in order to finish their task in time.
10 In the case of the divorcing couple the resolution of the underlying theoretical fitness issue does
presumably not yet imply a resolution of the practical custody issue.
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hazard’’ (p. 5). We agree that much plea-bargaining is likely to have very
unwelcome effects. Prosecutors may profit from their being better informed and
from the fact that they are in a position to manipulate and push the defendant into
going along with concessions that are unwarranted and unjust. Yet, this does not
exclude other plea bargaining situations where the risk confronted by shifting to
negotiation is much reduced, for example by providing assistance to vulnerable
parties, by excluding criminal offenses, or by banning particular kinds of pressure or
threat. In some situations, existing risks may be compensated by welcome effects.
So, we think that plea-bargaining would provide an excellent domain for studying
social restrictions on shifts from persuasion to negotiation dialogue, which is a topic
that we have thus far left aside.
In this section we saw that there can be good reasons available for the discussants
to shift from a persuasion dialogue to a negotiation dialogue and that discussants
may carry out such a shift in a licit manner. A licit shift from persuasion dialogue to
negotiation dialogue completely changes the nature of the conversation. After the
shift, the main goal of the dialogue is different: No longer will the parties attempt to
resolve their conflict; instead they try to settle it by compromise. Yet the ultimate
goal still consists in a kind of agreement. How does the agreement found in a
compromise differ from that found in a resolution? This issue will be dealt with in
the next section.
3 The Nature of a Compromise
What is the nature of a compromise, and how is a compromise different from an
outcome that qualifies as a resolution? This section deals with the sense in which
participants can settle their difference of opinion by means of compromise. In our
view, a compromise that settles a disagreement is different from a resolution of that
disagreement, even though it is connected to the resolution of related but different
disagreements. When the socialist party A and the liberal party B persist in
disagreeing with one another about the policy to be preferred and commence a
negotiation dialogue, it will be expected that a successful outcome will consist of a
compromise that lies ‘‘somewhere in the middle’’ between the original positions of
these parties. However, parties may mistake a compromise where the outcome is
‘‘somewhere in the middle’’ for a regular resolution of the policy issue. For
example, when the accuser pleads that the accused deserves to be put behind bars
for a full year, yet the accused pleads innocence, parties may conclude and agree
that the accused really deserves to be sentenced to half a year. But is this a
resolution or a compromise? It can be a resolution only if it is based on
argumentation that is fully convincing for both parties. We label the mistake of
presenting a compromise as a regular resolution, either to oneself or to others, the
Fallacy of Middle Ground.11
We start from the following definition of ‘‘compromise’’ offered by Weinstock:
11 There is not much literature to be found on the Fallacy of Middle Ground but there is a Wikipedia
entry devoted to the Fallacy of Moderation that broaches the subject (Wikipedia 2016).
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At a first approximation, a compromise is a position that, with respect to the
issue at hand, is from the point of view of parties locked in debate or
negotiation inferior to the positions that both (or all) bring to a decision
making process (a negotiation, an election, or more trivially a decision-
oriented discussion among friends), but which both have reason to accept
instead of the position they favor. They may favor X, when only the issue at
hand is in view, but favor Y when all things are duly considered (Weinstock
2013, p. 539).
Instead of conceiving a compromise as some kind of position, we prefer to amend
the definition so that a compromise is a kind of agreement that concerns an
arrangement that for each competing party is inferior to their initial positions yet
which they have reason to accept in the social setting at hand. We shall try to
provide further clarification by highlighting five features of compromises:
First, as we said, compromise is not resolution. A compromise about a policy
implies that the parties to the compromise still favor their initial policy proposals
and that they only subscribe to the compromise for the reason that each of them
happens to be unable to realize the adoption of its own preferred policy. No
compromise is without mutual concessions, in the sense of sacrifices.12 Thus, we do
not speak of a compromise in a situation where the parties come to acknowledge
strong features of one another’s positions, and where they change their minds about
what policy to pursue, even if the resulting consensus concerns a more intermediate,
middle-of-the-road policy than the preferred positions with which the parties
entered the conversation. As Benjamin writes: ‘‘Strictly speaking, a compromise
does not end the disagreement’’ (Benjamin 1990, p. 7).
Second, compromise is not imposed. A compromise is subscribed to in a
sufficiently free and autonomous manner, and is the outcome of a sufficiently non-
coercive process.13 After all, reaching a compromise counts as an outcome that is
based upon the parties’ decisions. (If one speaks of a ‘‘compromise’’ also when a
deal is imposed by one’s opponent, or by a third party, as a kind of dictate, the
expression is used in a much broader sense than the sense that we attach to it.) On
the other hand, some measure of pressure and even threat is inherent in negotiation
dialogue, which is a standard device for developing compromises. Some kinds of
threats seem to be an admissible part of negotiation dialogue, depending on specifics
of context, and within constraints, but we must admit that we do not dispose of a
detailed normative theory for negotiation dialogue that specifies the rights and
duties for the participants (see for a dialogue protocol in which threats, and rewards,
are instrumental for finding a compromise: Amgoud and Prade 2006). One general
constraint must be that the pressure does not spoil the cooperative process. Among
the prima facie acceptable ways of pressuring in negotiation dialogue we include the
12 Note that ‘‘concession’’ may also be used to refer to the kind of propositional commitment with which
one forgoes one’s right to challenge a proposition, yet without incurring an obligation to defend it, if so
requested. This usage is the more central one in accounts of persuasion dialogue (Walton and Krabbe
1995, pp. 186–187).
13 This constraint is related to the requirement, discussed in the context of public controversy, according
to which conversational strategies ought to be tolerant (van Laar and Krabbe 2016a).
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negative message suggested by a quid pro quo move—‘‘If you don’t accept the
concession I request I won’t accept yours’’ as well as the threat to abandon the
negotiation process. The outcome must, however, count as a result of free choices,
rather than of intimidation. Further, when we evaluate threats, we must take into
account the norms and conventions that happen to govern the communicative
practice in which the compromise is being fabricated (see Walton and Macagno
2006). Within particular international settings, a threat to block trade may be
conceived as quite appropriate for a negotiation dialogue, but not a threat to start a
war.
Third, a compromise is based on a kind of trade. Any compromise is made
possible by a distribution of material or other assets by which the participants, as it
were, split the difference and this holds equally for compromises that settle
differences of opinion. Underlying a compromise, there is some sort of exchange
and before agreeing on any exchange, the parties must, at some point, decide upon
or go along with a way of dealing with their difference of opinion as a problem of
distributing or trading items, such as mutual promises to act or to refrain from acts
in the future, thereby ‘‘commodifying’’ as it were their opinions. Of course, the
parties are not required to renege on their deeply held convictions. All that is
required for compromise to work is that the parties set up and acquiesce in some
measure of commodification. Even if, for instance, a party considers human beings
as God-ordained stewards of the earth, this party may—without abandoning this
principle—for practical purposes go along with a policy that does not do full justice
to its ideal of stewardship, in order to accommodate another, dissenting, party and
make some political headway.
Fourth, the acceptance of a compromise implies commitments. When a
negotiation dialogue results in a compromise consisting of the adoption of policy
P, each participant agreed to those actions that are required for P to get
implemented. Next to having these action commitments, the parties can be expected
to have agreed to particular propositions, and here we focus on these propositional
commitments (see Walton and Krabbe 1995). The primary propositional commit-
ment that an agreement on a compromise incurs is the proposition that all things
considered, including the (real or alleged) circumstance of there being an
irresolvable disagreement about what policy to pursue, P merits acceptance and
implementation. Thus, if a compromise must, afterwards, be vindicated vis-a`-vis
political supporters, the appropriate vindication requires an appeal to the compro-
mise’s gains, as well as an excuse of the compromise’s sacrifices in light of this
irresolvable disagreement. When, however, consensus about the implementation of
policy P results from a persuasion dialogue, each participant can certainly no less be
expected to have become committed to P’s meriting acceptance and implementation
but within any subsequent defense of P vis-a`-vis supporters an appeal to an
underlying irresolvable disagreement would be out of order.
More precisely, the justification of a compromise towards those who are to
endorse or ratify the deal plausibly requires a further commitment to support two
theses. First, the justification requires upholding the thesis of eligibility: that a
situation of endorsing (or ratifying) the compromise is to be preferred to a situation
of rejecting it, arguing for instance that the gains will outweigh the sacrifices.
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Second, the justification requires upholding the thesis of optimality: that there is no
compromise superior to the deal closed that all competing parties can be made to
accept (see van Laar and Krabbe 2017b for our account of the justification of
compromise; cf. Raiffa et al. 2002 on ‘‘efficient contracts’’).
In a properly conducted negotiation dialogue, the eligibility and the optimality of
the resulting compromise is promoted by giving each party both the opportunity to
make offers that are maximally advantageous for itself, and the opportunity to reject
offers by competing parties that are not considered sufficiently advantageous. By
tabling compromise proposals, the competing parties search for an outcome that
each of them prefers to the status quo and that each of them accepts as the best result
within reach given the existing differences of opinion amongst the competing
parties (See van Laar and Krabbe 2016b, Section 4; 2017a for our account of the
role of argument in fabricating a satisfactory compromise within a negation
dialogue).
Consequently, a compromise does not compete for the same intellectual space as
a standpoint about one’s firstly preferred policy: Without contradiction one may
defend policy P on substantial grounds as the preferred policy in those settings
where we can disregard dissenting peers, as well as a contrary policy P’ as the
preferred policy in those setting where we do have to take into account that
dissenting peers have to endorse the policy to be carried out.
Fifth, compromise may yield a resolution of actual or potential second-order
disagreements. We saw that settling a difference of opinion by means of
compromise is something quite different from realizing a resolution of this very
difference of opinion because a compromise does not eliminate the initial
disagreement. At the same time, we recognize a close tie between compromise
and resolution, because a compromise plausibly implies the closure of two
disagreements, whether actual or potential, both concerning the second-order
problem of how to respond to the fact that the first order issue of what policy to
pursue is irresolvable.
One kind of second-order disagreement is that about what method to select for
dealing with the irresolvable first-order issue. A successful compromise typically
implies a closure of any such second-order disagreement, because it typically
presupposes a shared choice for negotiation as a method. In so-far as a second-order
disagreement about the selection of a method is solved as a result of an exchange of
argumentation that convinced the parties to opt for negotiation—for example by
discussing the reasons for and against shifting to negotiation—the compromise can
be seen as yielding a resolution of this (actual or potential) disagreement.
Another kind of second-order disagreement is that about precisely what
compromise solution to select for dealing with the first-order problem. Given the
selection of negotiation dialogue as a method, a compromise concludes any such
further second-order disagreement. In so-far as a second-order disagreement about
the selection of a compromise is eliminated as a result of an exchange of
argumentation about the acceptability of the various offers, the compromise can be
seen as yielding a resolution of that (actual or potential) disagreement.
Let us label the resolution of a second-order (or: first-order) disagreement a
‘‘second-order (or: first-order) resolution’’. Then we can say that a compromise may
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yield second-order resolutions of disagreements concerning how to respond to the
fact that a first order disagreement about what policy to pursue is irresolvable. A
compromise plausibly often indicates resolutions of differences of opinion, but these
are second-order differences of opinion.
These insights can be illustrated as follows: Suppose, for instance, that you and I
disagree on the issue: ‘‘Should we adopt your preferred policy Alpha or my
preferred policy Beta?’’ Suppose further that we fail to realize a first-order
resolution of this issue by means of a persuasion dialogue. If we opt to proceed by
means of a negotiation dialogue, but do so only after considering the reasons for or
against such a shift, then, apparently, all second-order disagreement about selecting
a method for dealing with the irresolvable policy issue has been resolved. Let it
further be the case that the negotiation dialogue results in the mutually
acceptable compromise to settle for policy Gamma, and that the negotiation
dialogue provides us with ample opportunity to critically assess the standpoint that
indeed adoption of policy Gamma is acceptable in the circumstances at hand. Then
this outcome yields a second-order resolution of the second-order issue ‘‘Does the
selection of policy Gamma constitute an acceptable compromise within the current
setting where you prefer policy Alpha and I prefer policy Beta?’’ Note that the
resolution of such a second-order issue regarding a policy Gamma is often the result
of a series of failed attempts to resolve similar issues regarding other possible
compromises: the adoption of policies Delta, Epsilon, etc., such that by those failed
attempts the parties obtain the information that is required for them to arrive at this
particular second-order issue (regarding policy Gamma) that does admit of a
(second-order) resolution (see van Laar and Krabbe 2016b, Section 4; 2017a).
Returning to the Fallacy of Middle Ground: this can be seen as a fallacy based on
the illusion that a compromise equals a first-order resolution of the difference of
opinion that prompted the parties to compromise. We distinguish two variants of
this fallacy. Each of them can be diagnosed as a transgression of the argumentative
norm that premises that are unacceptable to a sufficiently astute opponent—whether
oneself in an internal dialogue or a different person in an external dialogue—should
not be smuggled in by presenting them as a matter of course (cf. van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 2004, starting-point rule, p. 193).
First, one may mislead oneself or others to accept a compromise Gamma as one’s
favorite policy choice, beguiled by the popular saying that the truth must be
somewhere in the middle. The website named The Nizkor Project gives the
following example of an alleged fallacy that seems to match with this first variant of
the Fallacy of Middle Ground (albeit outside of any context where one would expect
a compromise): ‘‘Some people claim that God is all powerful, all knowing, and all
good. Other people claim that God does not exist at all. Now, it seems reasonable to
accept a position somewhere in the middle. So, it is likely that God exists, but that
he is only very powerful, very knowing, and very good. That seems right to me’’
(Nizkor Project 2016). This way of flawed reasoning may play a role in settings
where a quarrel is used as evidence for the assumption that both are to blame, or
where the vehement denial of the accused is taken to be a reason to suppose that, as
a matter of fact, her acts could not have been as appalling as claimed by the
prosecutor.
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The second variant could also be called the Fallacy of No Middle Ground: one
may mislead oneself or others into refusing to subscribe to any compromise by
confusing a compromise with a first order resolution and concluding that a violation
of one’s integrity would inevitably result (See Benjamin 1990, pp. 36–37). A
politician may refuse to compromise on account of the impossibility to compromise
on matters of principle, failing to see the importance of second-order reasons for
compromises. However, a compromise can be entirely reasonable if it results from a
negotiation dialogue in which the participants, possibly in addition to exerting some
pressure, deliberate and reflect on the quality of the proposals (offers) and
counterproposals (counteroffers). Of course, neither of these variants of the Fallacy
of Middle Ground need be committed when one advocates or opposes a middle
ground position. It is perfectly feasible to avoid the ploy of presenting compromise
and (first order) resolution as equal, and though acknowledging the importance of
this fallacy, the main message of our paper is that one may turn to compromise in a
dialectically respectable way.
We conclude this section by discussing a possible objection. If there are reasons
that convince the parties to shift from their persuasion dialogue to a negotiation
dialogue, as well as further reasons that convince them to settle for a particular
compromise, there exist reasons that could have been used successfully within the
original persuasion dialogue to achieve a first-order resolution of a difference of
opinion in favor of the very same policy that resulted from the negotiation dialogue
(this objection, or at least a version of it, has been raised by Godden 2016).
Consequently, one may reason, any well-considered compromise could also have
been the outcome of a persuasion dialogue in which the parties are concerned
merely with the best possible policy outcome based on the objective merits of the
case. Thus, one may continue, well-reasoned compromises cannot be the focus of a
Fallacy of Middle Ground (i.e. mistaken for first order resolutions), for the reason
that there is, after all, a first-order resolution available in a persuasion dialogue
about that compromise policy.
We disagree. First, it is feasible that these parties are unable to craft an agreed
upon policy proposal in the context of a persuasion dialogue, yet are capable of
finding such a compromise solution in the context of a negotiation dialogue. In that
case, the first order resolution that would presumably be available would
nevertheless be inaccessible for the parties, so that they would do better to
negotiate. Second, agreement about a policy as an outcome of a negotiation
dialogue is of a different kind than agreement about a policy as an outcome of a
persuasion dialogue: a compromise is subscribed to on the basis of considerations
that do not only have to do with the objective merits of the policy, but also with the
social circumstance that mutual concessions are required to arrive at a shared policy.
Each party would still prefer a different policy if it were to disregard (1) that the
other side cannot be persuaded of one’s favorite position and (2) that a lasting
disagreement has highly negative effects. Therefore, the situation of a compromise
is quite different than that of a first order resolution on the merits. But then, as we
discussed above, there are second-order differences that get plausibly resolved when
a compromise is reached.
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How does a compromise settle the difference of opinion, if the initial
disagreement has not disappeared? It does so by the decision to move on, to take
one’s losses, and to implement the compromise through action. Thus, a compromise
settles a difference of opinion about the original preferences, without resolving it.
A Fallacy of Middle Ground can be committed by confusing the two kinds of
results. But then, agreeing to compromise does not by itself constitute a Fallacy of
Middle Ground: it can be the result of a dialectical procedure that is perfectly licit.
4 Conclusion
We have in this paper dealt with dialogue participants who shift from persuasion
dialogue to negotiation dialogue, and who turn to compromise rather than resolution
as a basis of further action. First, our dialectical reading of the considerations
brought forward by May and Weinstock showed that within a persuasion dialogue,
participants may dispose of and express good reasons for shifting towards a
negotiation dialogue in which they cooperate to settle their difference of opinion by
way of compromise. Splitting a difference of opinion may be a sensible idea, and
the shift towards negotiation can be warranted, and made without committing the
Fallacy of Bargaining. Second, we have found that a compromise that splits a
difference of opinion is quite different from a resolution of a difference of opinion,
and that splitting a difference of opinion does not imply any conceptual confusion
between the two, let alone that a Fallacy of Middle Ground has been committed. On
the other hand, we have seen that finding a compromise implies that potential
second-order disagreements admit of a resolution.
In a sequel to the paper at hand (van Laar and Krabbe 2017a; see also van Laar
and Krabbe 2016b, Section 4), we explain how arguments play a central role in
most, if not all, negotiation dialogues, especially so if they aim at splitting
differences of opinion. In our view, a negotiation dialogue made up from offers and
counteroffers can be reconstructed as an interlocked series of argumentative moves.
Each offer, counteroffer, countercounteroffer, and so forth, can be analyzed as being
made up from two elements: an ‘‘expediency argument’’ in support of the standpoint
that it is expedient for the interlocutor to accept the speaker’s policy proposal, and a
critical response to the premises of the expediency argument that was part of the
offer in the preceding turn by the interlocutor (this latter element is absent in the
very first contribution of the negotiation dialogue). In a successful negotiation
dialogue, the critical responses step-wise steer the participants towards a successful
final offer that happens to consist of an expediency argument based upon
propositions that the interlocutor is willing to accept. In this way, we explain how
compromise is in a special way connected to the resolution of a second-order
disagreement concerning how exactly to ‘‘split the difference’’, thereby underwrit-
ing the possibility of a thoroughly argumentative process of compromise formation.
Finally, we expect the argumentative analysis of negotiation to yield insights into
the ways compromises can be challenged by those not present at the negotiation
table and the ways they can be vindicated vis-a`-vis those challenges (van Laar and
Krabbe 2017b). In these ways, we aim to develop a theory about the analysis and
J. A. van Laar, E. C. W. Krabbe
123
evaluation of argumentation in those settings where people are prepared to settle for
a second-best solution.
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